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Abstract
We introduce a general framework for models of cascade and contagion processes on
networks, to identify their commonalities and differences. In particular, models of social and
financial cascades, as well as the fiber bundle model, the voter model, and models of epidemic
spreading are recovered as special cases. To unify their description, we define the net fragility
of a node, which is the difference between its fragility and the threshold that determines
its failure. Nodes fail if their net fragility grows above zero and their failure increases the
fragility of neighbouring nodes, thus possibly triggering a cascade. In this framework, we
identify three classes depending on the way the fragility of a node is increased by the failure
of a neighbour. At the microscopic level, we illustrate with specific examples how the failure
spreading pattern varies with the node triggering the cascade, depending on its position in
the network and its degree. At the macroscopic level, systemic risk is measured as the final
fraction of failed nodes, X∗, and for each of the three classes we derive a recursive equation
to compute its value. The phase diagram of X∗ as a function of the initial conditions, thus
allows for a prediction of the systemic risk as well as a comparison of the three different
model classes. We could identify which model class lead to a first-order phase transition in
systemic risk, i.e. situations where small changes in the initial conditions may lead to a global
failure. Eventually, we generalize our framework to encompass stochastic contagion models.
This indicates the potential for further generalizations.
PACS: 64.60.aq Networks, 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, busi-
ness and management, 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems, 62.20.M- Structural failure of
materials
1 Introduction
After the spread of the financial crisis in 2008, the term ’systemic risk’ could be well regarded as
the buzzword of these years. Although there is no consensus on a formal definition of systemic
risk, it usually denotes the risk that a whole system, consisting of many interacting agents, fails.
These agents, in an economic context, could be firms, banks, funds, or other institutions. Only
very recently, financial economics is accepting the idea that the relation between robustness of
individual institutions and systemic risk is not necessarily straightforward [24]. The debate on
systemic risk, how it originates and how it is affected by the structure of the networks of financial
contracts among institutions worldwide, is only at the beginning [6, 22]. From the point of view
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of economic networks, systemic risk can even be conceived as an undesired externality arising
from the strategic interaction of the agents [28]. However, systemic risk is not only a financial
or economic issue, it also appears in other social and technical systems. The spread of infectious
diseases, the blackout of a power network, or the rupture of a fiber bundle are just some examples.
Systemic risk – in our perspective – is a macroscopic property of a system which emerges due
to the nonlinear interactions of agents on a microscopic level. As in many other problems in
statistical physics, the question is how such a macroscopic property may emerge from local
interactions, given some specific boundary conditions of the system. The main research question
is then to predict the fraction of failed nodes X in a system, either as a time dependent quantity
or in equilibrium. Here, we regard X as a measure of systemic risk.
In this paper we investigate systemic risk from a complex network perspective. Thus, agents are
represented by nodes and interactions by directed and weighted links of a network. Each of the
nodes is characterized by two discrete states {0, 1}, which can be interpreted as a susceptible and
an infected state or, equivalently, as a healthy and a failed state. In most situations considered
here, the failure (infection) of a node exerts some form of stress on the neighbouring nodes which
can possibly cause the failure (infection) of the neighbours, this way triggering a cascade, which
means that node after node fails. This may happen via a redistribution mechanism, in which
part of the stress acting on a node is transferred to neighboring nodes, which assumes that the
total stress is conserved. There is another mechanism, however, where no such conserved quantity
exist, for example in infection processes where the disease can be transferred to an unlimited
number of nodes. In both mechanisms, the likelihood that a node fails increases with the number
of failures in the proximity of the node. This is the essence of a contagion process. The specific
dynamics may vary across applications, nevertheless there are common features which should be
pointed out and systematically investigated. Our paper contributes to this task by developing a
general framework which encompass most of the existing models and allows to classify cascade
models in three different categories.
A number of works have investigated processes of this type, sometimes referred to as ’cascades’
or ’contagion’. These were mostly dealing with interacting units with random mixing or, more
recently, with fixed interaction structures corresponding to complex networks. On the one hand,
there are models in which the failure dynamics is deterministic but the threshold, at which such
a failure happens, is heterogeneous across nodes. For simplicity, we refer to these as cascade
models – even though, according to the discussion above, they also involve contagion. To this
class belong some early works on electrical breakdown in random networks [17] and more recent
ones on the fiber bundle model (FBM) [31, 23, 18], on fractures [9], cascades in power grids [7],
or cascades in sand piles – the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld model (BTW) [13]. Further work refers to
congestion dynamics in networks, [4], cascades in financial systems [2] and in social interactions
[35], and overload distribution (in abstract terms) [25]. The properties of self-organized criticality
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of some of these models are well understood [34, 8]. The presence of rare but large avalanches is
of course relevant to systemic risk [30].
On the other hand, there are models in which the failure of a given node is stochastic but
the threshold at which contagion takes place is homogeneous across nodes. For simplicity, we
refer to this class as contagion models, even though they can lead to cascades as well. The best
known example is epidemic spreading (SIS) [26] [33]. The properties of these model have been
investigated in great detail on various network topologies, e.g. in the presence of correlations
[5] or bipatite structure [14]. However, as we will see later, we can also include the voter model
(VM) and its variants [32, 27] into this class. It is interesting to note that, while the macroscopic
behaviour of FBM and BTW in a scale free topology is qualitatively similar to the one on
regular and random graphs, the properties of SIS are severely affected by the topology. The
relation between cascading models and contagion models has not been investigated in depth,
although some models interpolating between the two classes have been proposed [10, 11]
To relate these two model classes of cascades and contagion, in the following we develop a gen-
eral model of cascades on networks where nodes are characterized by a two continuous variables,
fragility and threshold. Nodes fail of their fragility exceed their individual heterogeneous thresh-
old. The key variable is the net fragility z, i.e. the difference between fragility and threshold. This
variable is related to the notion of ’distance to default’ used in financial economics [1]. By speci-
fying the the fragility of a node in terms of other nodes fragility and/or other nodes failure state,
we are able to recover various existing cascade models. In particular, we identify three classes of
cascade models, referred to as ‘constant load’, ‘load redistribution’, ‘overload redistribution’. The
three classes differ, given that a node fails, in how the increase in fragility (called here the ‘load’)
of connected nodes is specified. We discuss the differences and similarities among these classes
also with respect to models from financial economics and sociology. For all of the three classes
we derive mean-field recursive equation for the asymptotic fraction of failed nodes, X∗. Clearly,
this variable depends on the initial distributions of both fragility and threshold across nodes. For
instance, if no node is fragile enough to fail in the beginning, then no cascade is triggered. We
thus compare how different models behave depending on the mean and variance of the initial
distribution of z across nodes.
As a further contribution, we extend the general framework to encompass models of stochastic
contagion. In such a framework, the failure of a given node is a stochastic event depending both
on the state of neighbourhood and on the individual threshold. We derive a general equation
for the expected change of the fraction of failed nodes, from which one can recover the usual
mean-field equations of the SIS model, but interestingly also of the VM, as special cases.
Our work wishes to contribute to a better understanding of the relations between cascading
models, contagion models and herding models on networks, from the point of view of systemic
risk.
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2 A Framework for Deterministic Models of Cascades
In this section we develop a general framework to describe cascading processes on a network.
This framework will be extended in Sec. 5 to encompass also stochastic contagion models. On
the microscopic side, we characterize each node i of the network at time t by a dynamic variable
si(t) ∈ {0, 1} characterizing the failure state. The state is si(t) = 1 if the node has failed and
si(t) = 0 otherwise. Other metaphors apply equally well to our model, e.g. ‘infected/healthy’,
‘immune/susceptible’, or ‘broken/in function’. On the macroscopic side, the system state at time
t is encoded in the n−dimensional state vector s(t), with n being the number of nodes. The
macrodynamic variable of interest for systemic risk is the total fraction of failed nodes in the
system
X(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
si(t). (1)
If values of X(t) close to one are reached the system is prone to systemic risk. When trajectories
always stay close to zero the system is free of systemic risk. For simplicity, in the following, we
will consider models which converge in X(t) to stationary states X∗. So, the final fraction of
failed nodes X∗ is our proxy for the systemic risk of the system.
In order to describe various existing models in a single framework, we assume that the failure
state si(t) of each node is, in turn, determined by a continuous variable φi(t), representing the
fragility of the node. A node remains healthy as long as φi(t) < θi, where the constant parameter
θi represents the threshold above which the fragility determines the failure. Conversely, the node
fails if φi(t) ≥ θ. In other words,
si(t+ 1) = Θ(zi(t)) , with zi(t) = φi(t)− θi (2)
where Θ is the Heaviside function (here meant to be Θ(z) = 0 if z < 0 and Θ(z) = 1 if z ≥ 0).
The variable zi(t) is called net fragility. As it is defined as the difference between fragility and
failing threshold its absolute value has the same meaning of distance to default in finance, for
z ≤ 0 [1]. Notice that in the equation above time runs in discrete steps, consistently with failure
being a discrete event.
This general framework can be applied to different models by specifying the functional form of
fragility. As we will see, depending on the case under consideration, φi(t) can be a function of
the failure state vector s(t) and some static parameters, such as the network structure and the
initial distribution of stress on the nodes. It can also be a function of the vector of fragility
φ(t−1) at previous times. The latter constitutes a coupled system with the vectors s(t) and φ(t)
as state variables. In any case, fragility depends on the current failure state and determines the
new failures at the next time step. Thus, cascades are triggered by the fact that failures induce
other failures. Specific models will be described in Sec. 3
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The interaction among nodes is specified by the (possibly weighted) adjacency matrix of the
network A ∈ Rn×n, with aij ≥ 0. For specific models some restrictions to the adjacency matrix
may apply, e.g. one may consider undirected links, no self-links or some condition on the weights.
In this framework the adjacency matrix of the network influences the dynamics only as a static
parameter, i.e., we do not consider feedbacks from the state of a node on the link structure as
in [20].
If we assume a large number of nodes, it makes sense to look at the distribution of the net
fragility z(t), in terms of its density function pz(t). Then from Eqn. 1 and 2 it follows that the
fraction of failed nodes at the next time step is given by
X(t+ 1) =
∫ ∞
0
pz(t)(z)dz = 1−
∫ 0
−∞
pz(t)(z)dz. (3)
In the cascading process new failures modify over time the values of fragility of other nodes. We
can also formulate the dynamics in the space of density functions:
pz(t+1) = F(pz(t)). (4)
If we know both the density function pφ(t) of the fragility at time t and the density function pθ
of the failing threshold, we can write
pz(t)(z) = pφ(t)−θ(z) = (pφ(t) ∗ p−θ)(z)
=
∫
pφ(t)(y) ∗ pθ(y − z)dy (5)
with ‘∗’ denoting the convolution. The expression above assumes that fragility and threshold
are stochastically independent across nodes. Depending on the specific model, the functional
operator F , in Eqn. (4), may also include dependencies on other static parameters. The general
idea is to find a density pz∗ that is an attractive fix point of F , so that the asymptotic fraction
of failed nodes X∗ is obtained via Eqn. (3).
3 Specific Cascading Models
In many cascading processes on networks, the failure of a node causes a redistribution of load,
stress or damage to the neighbouring nodes. In our framework, such redistribution of load can be
seen as if a failure causes an increase of fragility in the neighbours. In the following, we distinguish
three different classes of models, denoted as (i) ‘constant load’, (ii) ‘load redistribution’, and
(iii) ‘overload redistribution’. We keep the term ‘load’ because it is more intuitive. We will
show how these model classes are described in our unifying framework in terms of fragility and
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threshold, and how some models known in the literature fit into these classes. The differences
in the cascading process across the models will be illustrated by taking the small undirected
network of Figure 1 as an example. For each model, we consider the same initial configuration
φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
0
0.7
A
0
0.7
B
0
0.3
C
0
0.3
D
0
0.5
E
0
0.55
F
0
0.55
G
0
0.55
H
0
0.55
I
Figure 1: Initial configuration of the generic example used to illustrate all models. The legend
is valid for all further graphs of this type. The discrete state si is represented by the shape of
the node. A healthy node has si = 0, a failed one si = 1. A failing node is a node with si = 0
but zi > 0, so it will switch to the failed state in the next time step. Nodes are labeled with
capital letters. The level of fragility φi (which changes over time) is indicated inside each node.
The failing threshold θi (constant over time) is indicated as superscript to the node. The color
code specified in the colorbar refers to the value of net fragility zi = φi − θi.
with respect to the net fragility zi(0) in which all nodes are healthy (i.e. with zi(0) negative).
During the first time step, the value zC of node C is perturbed so that it fails. The subsequent
time steps reveal how the propagation of failure occurs in the different models.
3.1 Models with Constant Load
Model class (i) (‘constant load’) assumes that the failure of a node i causes a predetermined
increase of fragility to its neighbours. The term ‘constant’ does not imply that the increase is
uniform for all nodes (on the contrary, some nodes may receive more load than others). It means
that the increase in the fragility of node i, when its neighbor j fails, is the same regardless of the
fragility of j and of the situation in the rest of the system.
We can now distinguish two cases. In the first case, the increase in fragility of a node i is
proportional to the fraction of neighbors that fail. This is a reasonable assumption if the ties in
the network represent for instance financial dependencies or social influence. In the second case,
the increase in fragility of a node i, when neighbor j fails, is inversely proportional to the number
of neighbors of node j. In other words, the load of j is shared equally among the neighbours and
thus the more are its neighbours, the smaller is the additional load that each one, including i, has
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to carry. We will refer to the first case as the inward variant of the model because the increase
in fragility caused by the failure of one neighbour depends only on the in-degree of the node
receiving the load. In contrast, we will refer to the second case as the outward variant, because
the increase in fragility depends only on the out-degree of the failing node.
We now start by casting in our framework the well known threshold model of collective behavior
by Granovetter [15]. The model was developed in the context of social unrest, with people going
on riot when the fraction of the population which is already on riot exceeds a given individual
activation threshold. This model has been more recently reproposed as generic model of cascades
on networks [35].
We assume an initial vector of failing thresholds θ, and initial failing states si(0) = 0 for all i.
We define fragility as simply the fraction of failed neighbors,
φi(t) =
1
kini
∑
j∈nbin(i,A)
sj(t), (6)
with nbin(i, A) being the set of all in-neighbors of i in the network A and kini being the cardinality
of the set (i.e. the in-degree of i). This means that a node fails when the fraction of its failed
neighbors exceeds its failing threshold. Consequently, the initial fragility across nodes is zero
φi(0) = 0 for all i and the dynamical equation (2) implies s(1) = Θ(−θ). Thus, nodes with
negative threshold correspond to initial failures at time step t = 1.
Interestingly, we can map our inward cascading model with constant load also to an economic
model of bankruptcy cascades introduced in [3]. In that model firms are connected in a network
of credit and supply relations. Each firm i is characterised by a financial robustness ρi(t) which
is a real number, where the condition ρi(t) < 0 determines the default of the firm. Given a vector
ρ(0) of initial values of robustness across firms and a vector s(t) of failure states, the robustness
of firm i at the next time step is computed as
ρi(t+ 1) = ρ
0
i −
a
kini
∑
j∈nbin(i,A)
si(t) (7)
with nbin(i, A) being the set of in-neighbors of i, kini the in-degree of i, and a a parameter
measuring the intensity of the damage caused by the failure. New vectors of failing state vectors
and robustness are then computed iteratively until no new failures occur. Mathematically, this
process is equivalent to our inward variant model specified by Eqn. (6). The equivalence is
obtained by defining fragility φi as in Eqn. (6) and by setting
θi =
ρ0i
a
(8)
We note that the model specified in [3] also includes a dynamics on the robustness inbetween
two cascades of failures, which is not part of our framework.
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Let us now turn to the outward variant of the constant load model. It can be described within
our framework by defining fragility as
φi(t) =
∑
j∈nbin(i,A)
sj(t)
koutj
(9)
with koutj being the out-degree of node j. If the network is undirected and regular, i.e., all nodes
have the same degree, the inward and the outward model variants (6), (9) are equivalent and
lead to identical dynamics. However, if the degree is heterogeneous, then the number and the
identity of the nodes involved in the cascade differ, as shown in the example of Figure 2.
Notice that the influence of high and low out-degree nodes interchange in the two variants, as
well as the vulnerability of high and low in-degree nodes. In the inward variant, high in-degree
nodes are more protected from contagion as they only fail when many neighbours have failed. In
turn, when a high out-degree node fails, it causes a big damage if it has many neighbors with low
in-degree. In contrast, in the outward variant, a failing low out-degree node generates a larger
impact on its neighbours since the load is distributed among fewer nodes. Thus, a high in-degree
node is more exposed to contagion if it is connected to low out-degree nodes. On the other
hand, a failing high out-degree node does not cause much damage to its neighbors because the
damage gets divided between many nodes. In the examples reported in the figures, the network
is undirected and in-degree and out-degree coincide. Still the roles of high-degree and low-degree
nodes interchange as discussed above.
As another important difference between the two variants, the maximal fragility is bounded by
the value one in the inward variant, while it is bounded by the number of nodes n in the outward
variant, which is realized in a star network. Further, both variants strongly differ regarding the
impact of the position of the initial failure. Figure 13 (in Appendix B) shows an example, where
node I initially fails (instead of node C in Figure 2). The cascade triggered by that event is
larger in the outward variant than in the inward variant, in contrast to what seen in Figure 2.
Eventually, Figure 14 illustrates the dynamics of a cascade triggered by the failure of node E,
which has the highest degree. This results in a full cascade in the inward variant, while there is
no cascade at all in the outward variant. This observation illustrates the different influence of
nodes with high degree in the inward and the outward variant, as explained above.
3.2 Models with Load Redistribution
Model class (ii) ‘load redistribution’ is our second class of cascading models. In this class all nodes
are initially subject to a certain amount of load. Actually, in this model class fragility coincides
with load. When a node i fails, all of its load is redistributed among the first neighbours. This
mechanism differs from class (i) because in class (ii) the increase in fragility among the neighbours
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
0
0.7
A
0
0.7
B
0
0
C
0
0.3
D
0
0.5
E
0
0.55
F
0
0.55
G
0
0.55
H
0
0.55
I
inwards ↙ ↘ outwards
1
0.7
1
0.70
0
0.5
0.3
0
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
↓
1
0.7
1
0.71
0
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0.33
0.7
0.33
0.70
0
0.33
0.3
0
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
↓
0.33
0.7
0.33
0.70.5
0
0.33
0.3
0.5
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
↓
0.33
0.7
0.33
0.70.5
0
0.53
0.3
0.5
0.5 0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
Figure 2: Illustration of the cascading dynamics for the inward (left) and outward (right) variants
of model class (i) ‘constant load’, based on the general example of Figure 1. Initially, node C is
forced to failure by setting its failure threshold to zero. Subsequent time steps in the evolution
of the cascade are represented downward in the figure.
of i depends on the actual value of i’s fragility and not just on the fact that it exceeds the
threshold. The damage caused by one failure can thus not be specified a priori.
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Models belonging to this class include the fiber bundle model (FBM) [21] and models of cascades
in power grids [19]. In some cases it is possible to define the total load of the system, which,
additionally, but not necessarily, may be a conserved quantity. For instance, in the FBM a con-
stant force is applied to a bundle of fibers each of which is characterized by a breaking threshold.
When a fiber breaks, the load it carries is redistributed equally to all the remaining fibers, so the
total load is conserved by definition. In the context of networks, a node represents a fiber and if
the node fails the load is transferred locally to the first neighbours in the network. An analogy to
power grids is also possible, with nodes representing power plants, links representing transmission
lines, fragility representing demand and threshold representing capacity, respectively.
There are, several ways to specify the mechanism of local load transfer. A first variant is the
FBM with local load sharing (LLS) and load conservation, investigated in [18]. We refer to this
variant as LLSC. Despite the fact that load sharing is local, total load is strictly conserved at any
time, due to the condition that links to failed nodes remain able to transfer load (in other words,
links do not fail). A second variant implies load shedding instead, and we refer to it as LLSS.
In this variant, all links to failed nodes are removed and the load of a failing node is transferred
only to the first neighbours that are not about to fail. These are the nodes that are healthy and
below the threshold and thus will be still alive at the next time (although they may reach the
threshold meanwhile). However, if there are no surviving neighbours, the load is eventually lost
(or shed).
In the first variant we can cast the FBM-LLS [18] and extend it to the case of heterogeneous
load and directed networks.
From now on, we interpret ‘load’ as ‘fragility’, and ‘capacity’ as ’failing threshold’. Let φ0 ∈ Rn
be the vector of initial fragility (corresponding to the initial load carried by each node), and θ
the vector of failing thresholds (or maximal capacity). (For comparison: In [18] the threshold θi
for node i is denoted by σthν with values taken from a uniform distribution between zero and one.
The load of each node is the same and called σ¯ = σn , with σ being the total load.)
We define
reach1→0out (i, s, A) = {j | sj = 0, ∃ path of 1-nodes i→ j} (10)
as the set of healthy nodes which are reachable from node i following directed paths consisting
only of failed nodes (except i). Let kreachouti be the cardinality of such set. Moreover, we define
reach0→1in (i, A, s) = {j | sj = 1, ∃ path of 1-nodes i→ j} (11)
to be the set of nodes from which node i can be reached along directed paths consisting of failed
nodes (except i). Both sets of nodes defined above have to be computed dynamically based on
the current vector of failing states s and the network.
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Finally, given the initial fragility vector φ0, the failure state vector s(t), and the network A, we
define the fragility of node i at time t in the LLSC variant as
φi(t) = φ
0
i +
∑
j∈reach0→1in (i,A,s)
φ0j
#reach1→0out (j, s, A)
. (12)
We add that for an undirected network and uniform initial load, such a definition becomes
equivalent to the load concentration factor of node i, as defined in [18].
The assumption that links do not break and remain able to transfer load is not always satisfactory.
Some models have thus investigated the LLSS variant of the model in which the load is transferred
only to the surviving first neighbours [23]. In this case the load transfer is truly local and there
is no transmission along a chain of failed nodes. This implies that during a cascade of failures, at
some point in time the network might split into disconnected components which cannot transfer
load to each other. In particular, if one of these subnetworks fails entirely, all the load carried by
this subnetwork is shed.
As a consequence of the LLSS assumption, fragility now is not just a function of the current state
vector s(t) and some static parameters (such as the network matrix and the initial fragility φ0).
In contrast, it has to be defined through a dynamic process as a function of the fragility vector
at previous time t, according to the following equation:
φi(t+ 1) =
 φi(t) +
∑
j∈failin(i)
φj(t)
#heaout(j)
if
si(t) = 0,
φi(t) < θi
0 otherwise,
(13)
with failin(i) being the set of in-neighbors of i which fail at time t (but have not already failed!),
and heaout(j) the set of out-neighbors of j which remain healthy at time t+ 1
failin(i) = {j | j ∈ nbin(i, A), sj(t) = 0, φj(t) ≥ θj},
heaout(j) = {i | i ∈ nbout(j, A), si(t) = 0, φj(t) < θj}. (14)
Thus, Eqn. (13) is well defined unless heaout(j) is empty. In this case, there is no healthy neighbour
of j to which the load can be transferred, thus the load has to be shed. The remaining healthy
nodes remain unaffected.
Figure 3 illustrates, as an example, the different outcomes of the dynamics in the LLSC and
LLSS variants. The initial load is set to one for all nodes, thus the total load on the system is
nine. The values of the threshold are set in order to have the same values of z = φ − θ at each
node as in the example of Figure 1. As in Figure 2, we set the failing threshold of node C to one
in order to trigger an initial failure.
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
1
1.7
A
1
1.7
B
1
1
C
1
1.3
D
1
1.5
E
1
1.55
F
1
1.55
G
1
1.55
H
1
1.55
I
↓
1.33
1.7
1.33
1.70
1
1.33
1.3
1
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
LLSC (links remain) ↙ ↘ LLSS (links
fail)
1.67
1.7
1.67
1.70
1
0
1.3
1.67
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
↓
1.33
1.7
1.33
1.70
1
0
1.3
2.33
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
↓
(continued in next column)
(continuation)
↓
1.5
1.7
1.5
1.70
1
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
↓
1.33
1.7
1.33
1.70
1
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.58
1.55
1.58
1.55
1.58
1.55
1.58
1.55
↓
1.33
1.7
1.33
1.70
1
0
1.3
0
1.5 0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1.55
Figure 3: Illustration of the cascading dynamics for the two variants of the model class (ii) ‘load
redistribution’, based on the general example in Figure 1. Left: LLSC variant, following Eqn.
(12). Right: LLSS variant following Eqn. (13). Again, initially node C is forced to failure. The
dynamics is the same for the two variants in the first time step but it differs in the subsequent
time steps.
On one hand, we could expect that cascades triggered by the failure of one node are systematically
wider in the LLSC variant than in the LLSS variant because in the first one the total load
is conserved. On the other hand, in the LLSC, the fragility is redistributed also to indirect
neighbours thus leading to a smaller increase of fragility per node and therefore possibly to
smaller cascades. In fact there seems to be no apparent systematic result, the outcome being
dependent on the network structure and the position of the initial failure. In the example shown
in Figure 3 the cascade stops sooner in the LLSC variant than in the LLSS one, due to the
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rebalancing of load across the network. In other cases, however, if for instance node E initially
fails, we find that the load shedding has a stronger impact and the cascade is smaller in the LLSS
case.
3.3 Models with Overload Redistribution
We conclude our classification with class (iii) ‘overload redistribution’. When a node i fails in
these models, only the difference between the load and the capacity is redistributed among the
first neighbours. Actually, the overload of a node is its net fragility. This class is more realistic
in applications, where a failed node can still hold its maximum load and only has to redistribute
its overload.
The Eisenberg-Noe model is an important example of an economic model in which firms are
connected via a network of liabilities [12]. When the total liabilities of a firm i exceed its expected
total cash flow (consisting of the operating cash flow from external sources and the liabilities of
the other firms towards i), the firm goes bankrupt. When a new bankruptcy is recognized the
expected payments from others decline, but they do not vanish entirely. Thus the loss spreading
to the creditors is mitigated.
With respect to our framework, we can identify the total liability minus the currently expected
payments (from the liabilities of others) with fragility. Similarly, operating cash flow corresponds
to the failing threshold. The relation between the Eisenberg-Noe model and the overload redis-
tribution class is discussed more in detail in Appendix A.
Therefore, we adapt the two variants of load redistribution defined as LLSC and LLSS in Section
3.2 to the case of overload redistribution by subtracting the threshold value in the nominator of
Eqns. 12 and 13. We have
φi(t) = φ
0
i +
∑
j∈reach0→1in (i,A,s)
φ0j − θj
#reach1→0out (j, s, A)
. (15)
as definition of fragility in the LLSC version when links remain, and
φi(t+ 1) =
 φi(t) +
∑
j∈failin(i)
φj(t)−θj
#heaout(j)
if
si(t) = 0,
φi(t) < θi
0 otherwise,
(16)
as dynamical equation of fragility in the LLSS version when links break.
Using our small example of Figure 1, the cascading dynamics for the model class (iii) is presented
in Figure 4. In general, as we will see in Section 4 this class of models leads to much smaller
cascades, compared to class (ii). In this example, we have set the initial fragility of node C high
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
1
1.7
A
1
1.7
B
3.6
1.3
C
1
1.3
D
1
1.5
E
1
1.55
F
1
1.55
G
1
1.55
H
1
1.55
I
↓
1.77
1.7
1.77
1.71.3
1.3
1.77
1.3
1
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
links remain ↙ ↘ links fail
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.71.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.6
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
↓
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.71.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.6
1.5 1.03
1.55
1.03
1.55
1.03
1.55
1.03
1.55
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.71.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.47
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
Figure 4: Illustration of the cascading dynamics for model class (iii) ‘overload redistribution’.
Left: LLSC variant based on Eqn. (15). Right: LLSS variant based on Eqn. (16).
enough so that a large cascade is triggered. A very high initial overload is needed to trigger a
cascade of failures because this overload is the only amount which is transferred through the
whole system. On a failure nothing new is added to the total amount, because the node stays
with its maximum capacity.
Notice that the models of overload redistribution are invariant to joint shifts in the initial fragility
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φ0 and in the failing threshold θ. In other words, a system with φ0 + c and θ + c leads to the
same trajectory of failure state s(t) and fragility φ(t) + c. Thus, it is enough to study the model
with φ0 = 0 without loss of generality.
4 Macroscopic reformulations
In the previous section we have seen that the different classes of cascading models lead to a
diverse behaviour, at least in small scale examples, even if initial conditions for net fragility
are the same. In this section, by studying simple mean-field approximations of the processes we
find that there are significant differences also at the macroscopic level. In order to compare the
different model classes under the same conditions, we have set the probability density functions
pz(0) of initial values of the net fragility to be equal for all models. For the cases (i) constant
load, and (iii) overload redistribution we set θ = −z(0). Notice, that we can set φ0 = 0 in case
(iii) without loss of generality. For case (ii) load redistribution, instead, it is necessary to have
φ0 > 0 (otherwise there is no load to redistribute) and we have θ = φ0−z(0). We further assume
that the initial fragility φ0 is uniform across nodes in model class (ii).
Even a basic mean-field approach allows for an interesting comparison of the three model classes.
To do so, we replace the distribution of fragility at time t, with the delta function δ〈φ(t)〉 centered
on the mean fragility 〈φ(t)〉. This is equivalent to assuming a fully connected network since in
such a case Eqns. (6-13) yield the same fragility for every node. If the two distributions are
independent, from (5) we get
pz(t) = δ〈φ(t)〉 ∗ p−θ. (17)
Convolution with a delta corresponds to a shift in the variable, so that pz(t) = p〈φ(t)〉−θ, and from
Eqn. (3) we obtain
X(t+ 1) =
∫ ∞
0
p〈φ(t)〉−θ(z)dz =
∫ ∞
−〈φ(t)〉
p−θ(z)dz
=
∫ 〈φ(t)〉
−∞
pθ(z)dz = Pθ(〈φ(t)〉) (18)
where Pθ(x) =
∫ x
−∞ pθ(θ)dθ is the cumulative distribution function of θ. This is equivalent to a
change of variable z(t) = 〈φ〉−θ in the probability distribution and in the integral. However, the
procedure with convolution can be carried out also if pφ is not assumed to be a delta function.
At this point, we have to express the mean fragility 〈φ(t)〉 in terms of the current fraction of
failed nodes, X(t). For case (i) ’constant load’, in a fully connected network, Eqns. (6) and (9)
yield both the following mean fragility:
〈φ(t)〉 = X(t) (19)
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For case (ii) ’load redistribution’, assuming that the surviving nodes equally share the initial
load, we can write for the mean fragility:
〈φ(t)〉 = φ
0
1−X(t) (20)
This is obtained from Eqn. 12 at microscopic level by taking the mean over all i on both sides
〈φi(t)〉 =
〈
φ0i
〉
+
〈 ∑
j∈reach0→1in (i,A,s)
φ0j
#reach1→0out (j, s, A)
〉
(21)
Now, assuming φ0i = φ
0 for all nodes and the network as fully connected, we have that:
〈
φ0i
〉
coincides with φ0; the sum over the set reach0→1in (i, A, s) (which now coincides with the set of
failed nodes) equals nX(t); and #reach1→0out (j, s, A) equals n(1 − X(t)), because we count all
healthy nodes. Thus, we obtain
〈φ(t)〉 = φ0 + nX(t)φ
0
n(1−X(t)) =
φ0
1−X(t) . (22)
For case (iii) ’overload redistribution’, we can proceed similarly starting from Eqn. 15. Setting
φ0i = 0, without loss of generality, and taking the mean over i on both sides yields
〈φi(t)〉 =
〈 ∑
j∈reach0→1in (i,A,s)
−θj
#reach1→0out (j, s, A)
〉
(23)
Again, we can replace the sum over reach0→1in (i, A, s) by nX(t), and #reach
1→0
out (j, s, A) by n(1−
X(t)). However, now the average of the threshold values θj across all failed nodes (as indicated
by the sum) is not simply 〈θ〉. It is instead the mean of that part of the distribution pθ where
failed nodes are located. These are the nodes with θ ≤ φ(t) and their probability mass has to
sum up to X(t). For a given distribution pθ and a given fraction X of failed nodes, the mean
threshold of failed nodes is defined as
〈θ〉X =
(∫ qX
−∞
θpθ(θ)dθ
)
/X. (24)
qX denotes the X-quantile of the distribution pθ, i.e. a fraction X of the probability mass lies
below qX :
X =
∫ qX
−∞
pθ(θ)dθ (25)
Thus, 〈θ〉X is the first moment of θ below the value qX , normalized by the probability mass of
the distribution pθ in the same interval. Replacing this into Eqn. (23) yields as mean fragility
for case (iii) overload redistribution:
〈φ(t)〉 =
−〈θ〉X(t)X(t)
1−X(t) . (26)
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Notice, that the mean of the threshold of the failed nodes is negative, thus the minus in front of
〈θ〉X(t) ensures that fragility is positive.
By replacing the expressions of 〈φ(t)〉 in terms of X(t) in Eqn. (18) we obtain simple recursive
equations in X(t) for the different cases: For case (i) ’constant damage’
X(t+ 1) = Pθ(X(t)), (27)
for case (ii) ’load redistribution’
X(t+ 1) = Pθ
(
φ0
1−X(t)
)
, (28)
and for case (iii) ’overload redistribution’
X(t+ 1) = Pθ
(−〈θ〉X(t)X(t)
1−X(t)
)
. (29)
As the functions on the right hand sides of Eqns. (27)-(29) are monotonic non-decreasing and
bounded within [0, 1], X(t) always converges to a fix point X∗ representing the final fraction of
failed nodes.
With these iterations we can study the three different models systematically on the same
initial conditions. We assume the failing thresholds to be normally distributed such that
z(0) ∼ N (−µ, σ) in all three cases. This is guaranteed if θ ∼ N (µ, σ) for the cases of constant
load and overload redistribution, and if θ ∼ N (µ+φ0, σ) for the case of load redistribution. The
parameters µ and σ represent the mean and the standard deviation of the net fragility. Partic-
ularly, σ represents the initial heterogeneity across agents. The initial fraction of failed nodes
is thus X(0) = Φµ,σ(0) where Φµ,σ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The surface of values taken by the initial
fraction of failed nodes X(0) over the plane (µ, σ) is shown in Figure 5. This is assumed to be
the same in all three cases.
In contrast, the final fraction of failed nodes, X∗, obtained as numerical solution of the recursive
equations (27)-(29) is shown in Figure 6. Moreover, the difference between the two previous
quantities, X∗ −X(0), representing the fraction of nodes which fail due to the cascade process,
is shown in Figure 7.
At the macro level, the most important structural difference between the three model classes
concerns the existence of a discontinuity and its boundaries in the landscape of X∗. Since X∗
can be considered an order parameter for our system, regions with different values separated
by a discontinuity indicate a first-order phase transition. The proximity of the discontinuity, i.e.
across the boundary of the phase transition, marks a region of great interest from the point of
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−µ
σσ
pz
X =
∞∫
0
pz(z)dz
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Figure 5: Top: Illustration of the distribution of net fragility and geometric interpretation of
X. Bottom: Initial fraction of failing nodes X(0) as a function of mean −µ and standard devi-
ation σ of the distribution of initial net fragility z(0) = φ(0) − θ. The distribution is assumed
to be normal.
view of systemic risk. Indeed a small change in the distribution of initial net fragility can mean
the diïňĂerence between a negligible cascade or a full breakdown. In the case of ’constant load’,
we find a discontinuity between a region with low systemic risk and one with high systemic risk,
with a separation line that starts at (µ, σ) = (0, 0) and monotonically increases in µ and σ.
However, above (µ, σ) ≈ (0.5, 0.4) the discontinuity vanishes. In the case of load redistribution,
instead, the a region of full break down is always separated by a discontinuity from the region
of partial survival. Interestingly, the separation line when µ is seen as a function of σ is not
monotonic. For some µ (e.g µ = 0.2 when φ0 = 0.25) most nodes survive for small σ, half of the
nodes survive for large σ but all nodes fail for intermediate σ. This means that the system is
more robust for low heterogeneity and high heterogeneity, but more susceptible to systemic risk
in the region of intermediate heterogeneity. Finally, in the case of overload redistribution region
of full breakdown is reduced to the line with µ = 0 with no discontinuity towards the region of
partial survival.
Figure 8 shows the difference in the final fraction of failed nodes between the different model
classes. For instance, the top left plot shows the difference between class (i) and (ii), X∗(i)−X∗(ii).
It indicates that constant load implies larger fraction of failures than load redistribution, when
the initial load is small (φ0 = 0.25). This, however, does not hold for small µ and large σ,
where more nodes survive with constant load. Overload redistribution leads to smaller systemic
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 6: Final fraction of failed nodes X∗ in mean field approximation. As shown in Fig. 5,
the values −µ and σ refer to the initial distribution of z(0) = φ(0) − θ. The various plots refer
to the different model classes. Top left: class (i) constant load. Top right: class (ii) load redis-
tribution with initial load φ0 = 0.25. Bottom left: class (ii) with φ0 = 0.4. Bottom right: class
(iii) overload redistribution.
risk than constant load (top right part of Figure 8) and load redistribution (bottom left part of
Figure 8), except for very high µ and small σ. Interestingly, there is no model class which leads
to smaller systemic risk in the whole (µ, σ)-plane than the others. Finally, the parameter φ0 in
the load redistribution model has a monotonic effect: The larger it is the larger is the systemic
risk (bottom right part of Figure 8).
Even under the basic assumption of a fully connected network, the analysis carried out so far
(denoted in the following as MF1) was able to provide some insights in the relations among the
three model classes. The following remark is in order at this point. Mean field approaches have
known limitations. In principle, the foregoing analysis has little to say about the outcome of
individual realizations. For instance, consider the top right corner of the top left plot of Fig. 6. In
that region, X∗ takes intermediate values around 0.25. Does this imply that one time every four
there is a full breakdown and otherwise no failure? Or, does it imply that in every realization one
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Figure 7: Net fraction of failed nodes X∗ − X(0) due to the cascading process. Plots are ob-
tained from those in Figure 6 by subtracting the initial number of failed nodes (shown in
Figure 5).
fourth of the nodes fail? Notice that the cascade process is deterministic, and that the sources
of variability that are relevant for our purposes are the initial distribution of net fragility z(0)
and the network structure A. Our simulations show that, in absence of strong correlation in z(0)
across nodes and in absence of strong modularity in the network, the variability of X∗ across
realizations is quite limited. A robustness analysis is left as future work. For sure, in the regions
in which X∗ is very close to 1 the variability across realization is negligible and this is a useful
result in terms of systemic risk estimation. Finally, a strong variability is expected, as usual, in
the proximity of the transition between small and large systemic risk.
The mean-field approach, could now be refined in various ways, in order to take into account, for
instance, the cases of non-fully connected network, heterogeneous degree, or even degree-degree
correlation, following the methods that have been applied to epidemic spreading models [26, 5].
These investigation are left as future work.
In the remainder of this section, as an example, we analyse further the constant load class on
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Figure 8: Difference in fraction of failed nodes between class models. Top Left: X∗(i)−X∗(ii). Top
Right: X∗(i)−X∗(iii). Bottom Left: X∗(ii)φ0 = 0.25−X∗(iii). Bottom Right: X∗(ii)φ0 = 0.4−X∗(ii)φ0 = 0.25.
a network in which each node has on average k neighbors (instead of n − 1). This provides a
first step to address the influence of network topology on systemic risk. The fragility of a node
now takes values in the discrete set {0, 1/k, 2/k, . . . , j/k, . . . , 1}. The probability of each event
corresponds to the probability that j out of k neighbours fail at the same time, given that each
fails with probability q. If failures among neighbours of a node are independent, such probability
follows a binomial distribution B(j, k, q). We can further approximate the probability q that a
node fails with the total fraction of failed nodes X. Thus, we can write the probability density
function for the fragility as follows
pφ(t) =
k∑
j=0
B(j, k,X(t)) δ j
k
with B(j, k,X) =
(
j
k
)
Xj(1−X)k−j . (30)
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It follows
pz(t) =
 k∑
j=0
B(j, k,X(t) δ j
k
 ∗ p−θ
=
k∑
j=0
B(j, k,X(t)) p−θ+ j
k
(31)
from which we can derive recursive equations in X(t) analogous to Eqns. (27)–(29), to compute
X∗. A similar approach is used also in [11]. We denote this approach with MF2.
We can further refine the analysis by formulating a recursive equation for the whole distribution
pz(t) rather than for X(t). This approach can then take into account the fact that the distribution
of z(t) is reshaped (and not simply shifted) during the dynamics.
For this purpose, we define the partial pdf of healthy nodes phz(t) = 1[−∞,0]pz(t), where 1[a,b] takes
value one on the interval [a, b] and zero elsewhere. The integral of this function over the whole
real axis gives the fraction of healthy nodes, while the fraction of failed nodes is given by
X(t) = 1−
∫ 0
−∞
phz(t)dz. (32)
Notice that the total mass of the function phz(t) is in general smaller than one and decreases
over time (therefore, strictly speaking phz (t) is not a pdf). Because phz (t) only counts the healthy
nodes, the fraction of currently failing (and not already failed!) nodes, Xf , is defined as
Xf (t) =
∫ ∞
0
phz(t)(z)dz (33)
We can then write the recursive equation
phz(t+1) =
 k∑
j=0
B(j, k,Xf (t)) δ j
k
 ∗ (1[−∞,0]phz(t))
=
k∑
i=0
B(j, k,Xf (t))1[−∞, j
k
]p
h
z(t)+ j
k
. (34)
Summarizing, from Eqn. (34) we can solve for the limit distribution ph∗z or compute it numerically
(after binning the z−axis). This last method is denoted as MF3.
Methods MF2 and MF3 can be understood as conceptually different by focussing on the net
fragility of a single node coming for the distribution. For MF2 we compute the probability of a
node to have a certain net fragiity by its possibilities to have 0, 1, 2, . . . , k failed neigbors, thus
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the maximum increase in fragility is kk over all time steps. This fits to the inward agent-based
dynamics, because we focus on the receiving node which has k in-neighbors. In MF3 instead, after
each time step the whole distribution of the net fragility is reshaped. Thus, there is a nonzero
probabiity that one node gets more than k increases in net fragility in successive time steps.
We compute how the fraction of currently failing nodes reshapes the distribution of net fragility.
Thus, we focus on the spreading node here and there is a nonzero probability that one node can
receive more than k increases of 1k in two successive time steps, as it is also possible in a network
where in-degrees vary slightly. Thus, MF3 fits to the outwards agent-based dynamics.
Figures 9, 10, and 11 plot the limit fraction X∗ of failed nodes in the (µ, σ) plane obtained from
the recursive Equations (31) (MF2) and (34) (MF3), as well as a comparison with the case of
fully connected network (MF1) and a comparison between each other. Notice that, similar to
MF1, we still observe in both MF2 and MF3 a discontinuity line which vanishes as µ and σ
increase. The shape of the line varies in the three analyses. In the third approach, MF3, the
values of X∗ are systematically smaller than in MF2.
Moreover, in MF1 the region of high systemic risk is less extended than in the other approaches,
although for intermediate values of µ, σ, values of X∗ in MF1 are larger than in MF2, MF3 (blue
regions in Fig. 11). This is due to the fact that when many links are present, nodes are spreading
the fragility more evenly and so less failures take place, given the same initial fragility. After the
critical point the avalanche is larger.
On the other hand, approach MF2 always yields larger systemic risk than MF3 which takes into
account the whole distribution (see Fig. 11). Thus, the inwards version of the ‘constant load’
model is more prone to systemic risk than the outward version, this is especially relevant in the
region of very low σ, where MF2 shows full cascades up to µ ≈ 0.3, while MF3 is already free
from full cascades. A full cascade in MF3 is triggered only for slightly higher σ.
5 Generalization to Stochastic Cascading Models
5.1 Stochastic description
In Section 2 we have introduced a general model of cascades based on a deterministic dynamics
of the state si(t) of a node i, Eqn.( 2), with a sharp transition from healthy to failed state, at
exactly zi = 0. In this Section we propose a generalization of such process to a stochastic setting.
Interestingly, it will be possible to derive the Voter Model as well as the stochastic contagion
model SIS as particular cases. This exercise will shed some new light on the connections between
cascade models and contagion models.
23/43
Jan Lorenz, Stefano Battiston, Frank Schweitzer:
Systemic Risk in a Unifying Framework for Cascading Processes on Networks
European Physical Journal B, vol. 71, no. 4 (2009), pp. 441–460
See http://www.sg.ethz.ch for more information.
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 9: Model class (i) ’constant damage’, fraction of failed nodes X∗ on a regular graph
with degree k = 3. Plots are constructed in analogy to Figure 6. Left: mean field solution from
Eqn. (31) (MF2). Right: mean field solution from Eqn. (34)(MF3).
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Figure 10: Model class (i) ’constant damage’. Difference between fraction of failed nodes X∗
on a regular graph with degree k = 3 (shown in Figure 9) and on a fully connected network
(shown in Figure 6), based on different mean field approaches. Left: plot of the difference
X∗MF2 −X∗MF1. Right: X∗MF3 −X∗MF1. Color code as in Fig. 8. .
We assume that the failure of a node i is a stochastic event occurring with some probability
dependent on the net fragility, zi(t), but possibly also conditional to the current state, si(t). We
have in mind a situation in which the probability to fail increases monotonically as zi(t) = φi−θi
becomes positive. Conversely, nodes can switch from the failed state back to the healthy state and
this is more likely if z′i(t) = φi − θ′i becomes negative. Notice that we introduce an asymmetry,
24/43
Jan Lorenz, Stefano Battiston, Frank Schweitzer:
Systemic Risk in a Unifying Framework for Cascading Processes on Networks
European Physical Journal B, vol. 71, no. 4 (2009), pp. 441–460
See http://www.sg.ethz.ch for more information.
µ
σ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Figure 11: Model class (i) ’constant damage’. Difference X∗MF2−X∗MF3 between final fraction of
failed nodes obtained with approaches MF2 and MF3 shown in Figure 9. Color code as in Fig.
8.
as θ′i 6= θi in general. Compared to Equation (2), now the dynamics is defined as
si(t+ 1) =

1 with pi(1, t+ 1|1, t; zi) if si(t) = 1
1 with pi(1, t+ 1|0, t; zi) if si(t) = 0
0 with pi(0, t+ 1|0, t; z′i) if si(t) = 0
0 with pi(0, t+ 1|1, t; z′i) if si(t) = 1
(35)
Here, pi(1, t+ 1|0, t; zi) denotes the probability to find node i in state 1 at time t+ 1, conditional
that it was in state 0 at time t, etc. Obviously,
1 = pi(1, t+ 1|1, t; zi) + pi(0, t+ 1|1, t; z′i)
1 = pi(0, t+ 1|0, t; z′i) + pi(1, t+ 1|0, t; zi) (36)
In the following, we abbreviate the relevant conditional probabilities as p(1|0, zi) = pi(1, t +
1|0, t; zi), p(0|1; z′i) = pi(0, t + 1|1, t; z′i) and denote them as transition probabilities (per unit of
time). Under Markov assumptions the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation holds for the probability
to find node i in state 1 at time t+ 1:
pi(1, t+ 1) = pi(1, t+ 1|1, t, zi) pi(1, t)
+pi(1, t+ 1|0, t, zi) pi(0, t) (37)
With
1 = pi(1, t) + pi(0, t) (38)
and Eqn. (36), this results in the dynamic equation
pi(1, t+ 1)− pi(1, t) = −p(0|1, z′i) pi(1, t)
+p(1|0, zi) [1− pi(1, t)] (39)
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Stationarity, i.e. pi(1, t+ 1)− pi(1, t) = 0, implies the so-called detailed balance condition:
pi(1)
1− pi(1) =
p(1|0; z′i)
p(0|1; zi) (40)
A very common assumption for pi(1) is the logit function:
pi(1;β, β
′; zi, z′i) =
exp(βzi)
exp(βzi) + exp(−β′z′i)
(41)
The parameters β, β′ measure the impact of stochastic influences on the transition into the
failed state and back into the healthy state, accordingly. By varying β, β′ the deterministic
case (β, β′ → ∞) as well as the random case (β, β′ → 0) can be covered. Figure 12 shows
the dependency of the probability p = p(1) with respect to β for the symmetric case, β = β′,
z = zi = z
′
i.
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
z
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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Figure 12: Probability p = p(1), eqn. (41), dependent on z = zi = z′i for several values of
β = β′, to indicate the crossover from a random to a deterministic transition: (blue) β = 0.05,
(green) β = 0.5, (red) β = 5, (black) β = 50
The transition probabilities can be chosen in accordance with Eqs. (40), (41) as follows:
p(1|0; zi) =γ exp(βzi)
exp(βzi) + exp(−β′z′i)
p(0|1; z′i) =γ′
exp(−β′z′i)
exp(βzi) + exp(−β′z′i)
(42)
The parameters γ, γ′ set the range of the functions and should be equal only if the detailed
balance condition holds. The different thresholds θ, θ′ shift the position of the transition from
one state to the other. The transition probabilities thus depend on two sets of parameters, γ,
β, θ characterizing the transition into the failed state, and γ′, β′, θ′ for the transition into the
healthy state. These sets differ in principle, but they play the same role in the transitions.
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5.2 Mean-field equations
In analogy to Section 4, we want to derive a dynamics at the macro level for the expected fraction
X(t) of failed nodes at time t. To this end, we start from the micro dynamics given by Eqn. (39).
As a first mean-field assumption, we neglect correlations between fragility and thresholds across
nodes in the network. In other words, we assume that the values of zi and z′i are drawn from
the same probability distribution pz(z(t)), regardless of the identity of the node. The expected
change in the probability pi(1, z, t) for node i is obtained by integration:
E[pi(1, t+ 1) − pi(1, t)] =
∫
R
pz(z(t))p(1|0; z)pi(0, z, t)dz
−
∫
R
pz(z
′(t))p(0|1; z′i) pi(1, z′, t)]dz′. (43)
To avoid any confusion with the notation, we recall that pz is the density function of the net
fragility z, while p(1|0; z) is the probability that a node with net fragility z switches from state
0 to state 1, and finally pi(0, z, t) is the probability that node i with net fragility z is in state 0
at time t.
We now average both sides of the equation above across nodes. In particular, the average of the
r.h.s. yields ∫
R
pz(z(t))p(1|0; z) 1
n
∑
i
pi(0, z, t)dz
−
∫
R
pz(z
′(t))p(0|1; z′) 1
n
∑
i
pi(1, z
′, t)dz′. (44)
Noticing that, for large n
X(t) = 1n
∑
i pi(1, z, t)
1−X(t) = 1n
∑
i pi(0, z, t) (45)
we get
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = (1−X(t))
∫
R
pz(z(t))p(1|0; z(t))dz
−X(t)
∫
R
pz(z
′(t))p(0|1; z′)dz′. (46)
Equation (46) describes the dynamics of the expected fraction of failures in a system with both
heterogeneity of threshold, θ, or fragility, φ, and with stochasticity in the cascading mechanism.
We can now obtain mean-field equations for various existing models, by specifying (1) the tran-
sition probabilities p(1|0; z) and p(0|1; z′), and (2) the distribution pθ(θ) for the thresholds θi.
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5.3 Recovering Deterministic Cascade Models
In order to recover the deterministic models of Section 3, we first notice that in those cases
the transition from state s = 0 to s = 1 is not really conditional to the state at previous
time. Actually, in these models a node changes to a certain state with a probability which is
independent of its current state. We emphasize, however, that our framework is general enough
to cover cases in which failure is really conditional on s.
For the models discussed in Section 3, we can assume θ′ = θ and thus z′ = z, and further β = β′,
γ = γ′ = 1. We have then
p(1|0; z) = p(1|1; z) = p(1; z)
p(0|1; z) = p(0|0; z) = p(0; z). (47)
We now set β →∞, which implies that the transition probability in Equation (42) tends to the
Heaviside function:
p(1|0; z) = Θ(z) ; p(0|1; z) = Θ(−z) (48)
Since, for any real function g holds∫
R
g(x)Θ(x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
g(x)dx, (49)
we obtain
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = (1−X(t))
∫ ∞
0
pz(z(t))dz
−X(t)
∫ 0
−∞
pz(z(t))dz. (50)
Because of
∫ 0
−∞ pz(z(t))dz +
∫∞
0 pz(z(t))dz = 1, this finally yields
X(t+ 1) =
∫ ∞
0
pz(z(t))dz (51)
Eqn. (51) coincides with Eqn. (3).
5.4 Recovering Stochastic Models with Homogeneous Threshold
In order to recover models of herding and stochastic contagion, we instead keep the stochastic
nature of the failure but we assume that the failure threshold is the same across nodes, θi = θ,
∀i. In a mean field approximation, we replace the individual fragility with the average one, so
that also zi is constant across the nodes zi = z ∀i. Then the probability density of z in Equation
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(46) is equivalent to a delta function and the integral over dz drops. The macroscopic mean-field
equation then reads
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = (1−X(t)) p(1|0; z)−X(t) p(0|1; z) (52)
Eqs. (52) will be the starting point for discussing specific contagion models in Sections 5.5, 5.6.
5.5 Voter Model
The linear voter model (LVM) is a very simple model of herding behavior. The dynamics is given
by the following update rule: a voter, i.e. a node i ∈ A of the network, is selected at random and
adopts the state of a randomly chosen nearest neighbor j. After n such update events, time is
increased by 1. The probability to choose a node j in state 1 from the neighborhood of node i is
proportional to the frequency of nodes with state 1 in that neighborhood, fi (and conversely for
state 0). Consequently, the transition probability towards the opposite state is proportional to
the local frequency of the opposite state. It is also independent of the current state of the node.
p(1) = p(1|1) = p(1|0) = fi
p(0) = p(0|0) = p(0|1) = 1− fi (53)
In order to match this dynamics within our framework, we consider values of β of the order of
1. From Equation (42), we obtain in linear approximation:
p(1|0, zi) = γ
2
[1 + βzi]
p(0|1, zi) = γ
′
2
[
1− β′z′i
]
. (54)
With θi = θ′i, β = β
′, γ = γ′, this matches the transition probabilities for the LVM provided
that:
γ [1 + β(φ− θi)] = 2fi
γ [1− β(φ− θi)] = 2 (1− fi) (55)
This is realized by choosing
γ = 1 ; β = 2 ; θ =
1
2
⇒ φi = fi (56)
We note that the threshold θ coincide with the unstable equilibrium point of the LVM, 1/2,
that distinguishes between minorities and majorities in the neighborhood. The fragility equals
the local frequencies fi of infected nodes, and does not depend on the node itself. If a majority
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of nodes in the neighborhood has failed, this more likely leads to a failed state of node i; if
the failed nodes are the minority, this can lead to a transition into the healthy state. Since the
fragility coincides with fraction of neighbours in state 1 (or 0), VM fits in the first model class
described in Sec. 3.1, with the specificity that the failure process is stochastic and the threshold
is homogeneous across nodes.
As a consistency check, if we assume for one moment the failure process to be deterministic,
one could directly apply Eqn. (27). Since the probability distribution of the threshold would be
trivially a delta function δ1/2(θ), its cumulative distribution would be the Heaviside function
Pθ(X) = Θ(X − 1/2). This would imply that the dynamics reaches X∗ = 1 as stable fix point
as soon as X(0) > 1/2 and viceversa for X∗ = 0.
Coming back to the usual stochastic VM, in order to obtain the mean-field dynamics, we now
approximate fi(t) with X(t), i.e. we replace p(1|0, z) = X(t), p(0|1, z) = 1 −X(t) in Equation
(52). This recovers the well known mean-field dynamics of the LVM, dX/dt = 0, i.e. the expected
asymptotic fraction of failures (which differs from the individual realizations) coincide with the
initial fraction X(0) of failed nodes.
With a similar procedure we can also account for nonlinear VM [27], in which the probability to
switch to a failed or healthy state is a non-linear function of the fraction of failed nodes in the
neighborhood:
p(1|0; zi) = p(1) =fi(t) F1(fi(t))
p(0|1; zi) = p(0) =(1− fi(t)) F2(fi(t)) (57)
F1 and F2 are frequency dependent functions which describe the non-linear response of a node on
the fraction of failed nodes in the neighborhood. If we again replace fi with the global frequency
of failures X, we arrive at the macroscopic dynamics in mean-field limit:
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = (1−X(t))X(t) [F1(X)− F2(X)] (58)
In the linear case F1 = F2 = 1, the prediction for the expected value of X does not give sufficient
information about individual realizations of the Voter dynamics. In fact, it is well known that the
global outcome of the LVM leads to global failure with a probability equal to the initial fraction
of infected nodes, X(0). In other words, if we run a simulation with e.g. X(0) = 0.3 for 100
times, then in 30 cases we will reach a state of global failure, whereas in 70 cases, no failure at
all will prevail. This differs from the case of the cascading models described in Sect. 3, in which
the mean field dynamics gives us some more information about individual realizations.
In the non-linear case (F1 6= 1, F2 6= 1), different scenarios arise depending on the nonlinearity.
In [27] it was shown that even a small non-linearity may lead to either states where global failure
is always reached, or to states with a coexistence of failed and healthy nodes. It is worth noticing
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that both of these scenarios are obtained with positive frequency dependence, i.e. a transition
probability to fail that increases monotonically with the local frequency f . Thus, small deviations
in the nonlinear response can either enhance systemic risk, or completely prevent it.
5.6 SIS-SI model
The SIS model [33] is the most known model of epidemic spreading. On the microlevel, healthy
nodes get infected with probability ν if they are connected to one or more infected nodes. In
other words, the parameter ν measures the infectiousness of the disease in case of contact with
an infected node. This means that the effective transition probability of node i from healthy to
infected state is proportional to the probability q that a neighbour is infected times the degree
ki of the node. Indeed, the larger the number of contacts, the more likely it is to be in contact
with an infected node. On the other hand, failed nodes recover spontaneously with probability
δ. The transition probabilities are then as follows:
p(1|0, zi) = ν ki q; p(0|1) = δ (59)
with 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. We do not redefine, as usually done, the infection rate as λ = ν/δ with δ = 1,
because we want to cover the case δ = 0, as we will see below.
We interpret of course infection state as failure state. Matching the transition probabilities of
SIS with the ones in our framework, we obtain:
γ [1 + β(φ− θi)] = 2ν ki q
γ′
[
1− β′(φ− θ′i)
]
= 2δ (60)
This implies that our framework recovers the transition probabilities of the SIS model, provided
that:
γ = 1 ; β = 2 ; θ =
1
2
⇒ φi = ν ki q
γ′ = 2δ ; β′ = 0 (61)
In order to understand the relation of SIS with the other models, we can approximate the
probability q that a node fails with the fraction of failed neighbours fi. The resulting expression
for the fragility, φi = νkifi, is proportional to the fraction of failed nodes as in model class (i)
of Sec. 3.1. However, the term ki implies that the infection probability grows with the number
of connections in the network. This feature makes the biggest difference between the SIS model
and the cascade models studied in the previous sections, apart of course from the fact that the
contagion process is stochastic and the threshold homogeneous. Another important feature that
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emerges is the asymmetry in the transition probabilities between healthy and failed state and
backwards.
In order to derive a macroscopic dynamics, we apply the mean-field approximation fi ∼ q ∼ X
and we assume a homogeneous network with ki = k for all nodes. Starting from Equation (52),
we obtain
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = ν kX(t)(1−X(t))− δX(t) (62)
The last negative term in the R.H.S. of Eqn. (62) implies that there is no global spreading of
infection if ν < νc = δk and the only stable fix point is X
∗ = 0. For ν ≥ νc there is a unique
stable fix point with X∗ > 0.
As it is well known, the existence of a critical infection rate νc does not hold, however, if, instead
of the mean-field limit with homogeneous degree, a heterogeneous degree distribution of the
nodes is assumed [33]. The implications of degree heterogeneity and degree-degree correlation in
epidemic spreading have been investigated in a number of works [5].
The SI model, in which no transition into the healthy state is possible, is recovered setting
additionally δ = 0. We then obtain the logistic growth equation:
X(t+ 1)−X(t) = ν k X(t)(1−X(t)) (63)
where X(t) = 1 is the only stable fix point of the dynamics. Any initial disturbance of a healthy
state eventually leads to complete infection.
We conclude by noting that, despite its simplicity, the SI model has been used to describe a
number of real contagious processes, such as the spread of innovations [16] or herding behav-
ior in donating money [29]. In the latter case, the mean-field interaction was provided by the
mass media. In other words, because of the constant and homogeneous information about other
people’s donations, the individual transition depends on the global (averaged) frequency of do-
nations instead of the local one. Interestingly, it could be shown that in the particular example
of ’epidemic’ donations, the time scale depends itself on time, indicating a slowing down of the
dynamics due to a decrease in public interest.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we wish to clarify the meaning and the emergence of systemic risk in networks
with respect to several existing models. To unify their description, we propose a framework in
which nodes are characterized (1) by a discrete failure state si(t) (healthy or failed) and (2) by
a continuous variable, the net fragility, zi(t), capturing the difference between fragility φi of the
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node and its failing threshold θi. By choosing an appropriate definition of fragility in terms of
the failure state and/or the fragility of neighbouring nodes, we are able to recover, as special
cases, several cascade models as well as contagion models previously studied in the literature.
Our paper contributes to the investigation of these models in several ways. First of all, we have
provided a novel framework to cover both cascade and contagion models in a deterministic ap-
proach, which is further suitable to be generalized also to the stochastic case. Secondly, our
framework allows us to unify a number of existing, but seemingly unrelated models, pointing
out to their commonalities and differences. Thirdly, we are able to identify three different model
classes, which are each characterized by a specific mechanism of transferring fragility between
different nodes. These are (i) ’constant load’, (ii) ’load redistribution’, and (iii) ’overload redis-
tribution’.
Systemic risk, within our framework, is defined as the stable fraction of failed nodes X∗ in
the system. As X∗ = 1 denotes the complete breakdown of a system, we are interested in
trajectories of the system where X∗ is much below one. In order to determine these trajectories,
in this paper we derive a macroscopic dynamics for X(t) based on the microscopic dynamics. As
a major contribution of this paper, we are able to find, for each of the three classes, macroscopic
equations for the final fraction of failed nodes in the mean-field limit.
In order to compare the systemic risk between the three classes, we have studied the macroscopic
dynamics of each of them with the same initial conditions. Most importantly, we found that
the differences on the microscopic level translate into important differences on the macroscopic
level, which are visualized in a phase diagram of systemic risk. This indicates, for each of the
model classes, which given initial conditions result into what total fraction of failure. This way
we could verify that, for instance, in class (ii) there is a first-order transition between regions
of high systemic risk and regions with low systemic risk. In contrast, class (i) displays such a
sharp transition only in some smaller part of the phase space, while class (iii) does not display
any abrupt transition at all. Such an insight helps us to understand whether and for which
parameters small variations of initial conditions may lead to an abrupt collapse of the whole
system, in contrast to a gradual increase of systemic risk.
In addition to the macro dynamics, we have also investigated the different model classes on
the microscopic level. A number of network examples made clear how the different transfer
mechanisms affect the microdynamics of cascades. As an interesting insight, we could demonstrate
that the role of nodes with high degree change depending on type of load transfer. In the inwards
variant of first class model, high degree nodes are more protected from contagion, whereas in the
outwards variant of the same class, they become more exposed to contagion if they are connected
to many low degree nodes (which holds for disassortative networks). Furthermore, we could point
out that the results strongly depend on the position of the initially failing node. A systematic
analysis identifying the crucial nodes from a systemic risk point of view is left for future work.
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Finally we have extended our general framework so to encompass models of stochastic contagion,
as known from VM and SIS. Both of these models belong to the first class, but differently from
the models studied in Section 3.1, the threshold is homogeneous and the failure is stochastic.
Hence, it becomes more clear how these established models of herding behavior and epidemic
spreading are linked to the ’cascade’ models discussed in the literature.
Our work could be extended in several ways. First, one could apply techniques to deal with
heterogeneous degree distributions to the three classes of cascading model, introduced in Sec. 3.
This could be carried out also in the presence of degree-degree correlation, as recently discussed
for contagion models [5]. Furthermore, one could investigate more in detail the case of both het-
erogeneous threshold and stochastic failures. Compared to the simple SIS, it seems more realistic
to assume that the probability of contagion depends on an intrinsic heterogeneous property of
the nodes (the threshold). Such heterogeneity could also play a crucial role, as it has been found
for the heterogeneity in the degree [33].
A last remark is devoted to the discussion of systemic risk. In our paper, we have provided
mean-field equations to calculate the total fraction of failed node in a system, which we regard
as a measure of systemic risk. This implies that systemic risk is associated with a system state
of global failure, i.e. there is no ’risk’ anymore, as almost all nodes already failed. In contrast,
it could be also appropriate to define ’systemic risk’ as a situation, where the system has not
failed yet, but small changes in the initial conditions or fluctuations during the evolution may
lead to its complete collapse. Our general framework has already contributed insight into this
problem, by identifying those areas in the (mean-field) phase diagram where we can observe
a sharp transition between a globally healthy and a globally failed system. This is related to
precursors of a crisis as it identifies parameter constellations to make a system vulnerable that
looks apparently healthy. On the other hand, using our approach we were able to assess that for
certain transfer mechanisms such an abrupt change in the global state is not observed at all –
which means that systems operating under some conditions are less vulnerable to small changes.
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A Eisenberg-Noe model
An interesting model of contagion which has not been investigated in the econophysics litera-
ture is the one developed by Eisenberg and Noe [12]. It introduces a so called fictitious default
algorithm as a clearing mechanism in a financial system of liabilities. When some agents in the
system cannot meet fully their obligations, the task of computing how much each one owes to
the other becomes nontrivial in presence of cycles in the network of liabilities.
The basic assumptions of the clearing mechanism are (i) limited liability (a firm need not spend
more than it has), (ii) absolute priority of debt over cash (a firm has to spend all available cash
to satisfy debt claims first), (iii) no seniority (all claims have the same priority).
A financial system of n firms is described by a vector of total obligations x0, a matrix of relative
liabilities A, and a vector of operating cash flows θ. x0i is the total amount of liabilities firm i has
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towards other firms, aij specifies what fraction of its own total obligations firm i owes to firm
j, and θi determines the liquid amount of money of firm i. Thus, aijx0i is the nominal liability i
has to j. The matrix A is row-stochastic, which means all entries are non-negative and rows sum
up to one. This condition ensures that individual obligations sum up to the total obligations x0j .
The expected payments to firm i from its debtors is thus:
(ATx0)i =
n∑
j=1
ajix
0
j (64)
If it happens that the total cash flow, i.e., the expected repayments of others plus operating
cash-flow, is less than the total obligations, i.e.
θi +
n∑
j=1
ajix
0
j < x
0
i (65)
firm i cannot meet its obligation in full and defaults. This implies a reduction of the expected
payments to its creditors, which might in turn default as a second-order effect, and so on. This
makes this model close to the class of overload redistribution because the expected payments of
a node do not vanish entirely when it fails.
The fictitious default algorithm defined in [12] consists of finding a clearing vector x∗ of total
payments which fulfills the equation
xi = min{θi +
n∑
j=1
ajixj , x
0
i } (66)
for all i. As shown in [12], using mild assumptions, such a clearing vector exists and is unique
and the fictitious default algorithm, with x(0) = x0, is well defined. The sequence x(t) represents
a decreasing sequence of clearing vector candidates which terminates in at most n steps at the
clearing vector. The new clearing vector candidate x(t+ 1) is computed from a given candidate
x(t) taking into account the first order defaults given clearing vector candidate x(t), but not the
second order defaults. These are checked in the successive time steps.
Following our general framework presented in Section 2, we can define fragility as
φi(x(t), x
0, A) = x0i −
n∑
j=1
ajixj(t) (67)
which is the amount of debt which has to be covered by the operating cash flow θi, given the
current candidate for the clearing vector x(t). From x(t), x0, A, and θ we can determine the
failing state si(t+ 1) as in Equation (2) as
si(t+ 1) = Θ(φi(x(t), x
0, A)− θi). (68)
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Given a clearing vector candidate x(t), the value of the equity of firm i is given by
θ +
n∑
j=1
ajixj(t)− xi(t) (69)
which is the operating cash flow plus the expected amount of payments received by others minus
the payment to others which are possible, given the currently expected payments from the other.
A new clearing vector candidate x(t+ 1) is computed from x(t) by determining the failing state
s(t + 1). This leads to a simple fix point equation (see Eisenberg and Noe [12, p. 243]), which
usually has a unique fix point. That means, the fictitious default algorithm is constituted in such
a way that it solves a system of linear equations. If successful, the algorithm runs until a clearing
vector is found which gives that the value of the equity is zero (and not negative) for a firm in
default, and positive for a non-defaulting firm. At least one non-defaulting firm should be found
by the fictitious default algorithm, which means that there is at least one firm i for which it
holds xi(t) = x0i holds. If not, then the clearing vector candidates diverge toward −∞, and the
algorithm fails. This represents a full break down of the financial system.
The relation between this model and our third model class is not straightforward because the new
clearing vector candidate x(t) is not necessarily always uniquely defined by the current fragility
φ(t) as given in (67). Therefore, we chose to study the simpler models in Sec. 3.3.
Investigating the macro-perspective as in Section 4, one finds that the Eisenberg-Noe model can
be approximated by the macroscopic equation for the overload redistribution. The approxima-
tions would be fairly good when the system is close to a fully connected network (everybody
borrows equally from everybody else) and uncorrelated operating cash flows.
B Further examples
Section 3 has pointed out that the propagation of cascades, in addition to the mechanism of
transfer, strongly depends on the initial condition, in particular on the position of the first
failing node. In order to further illustrate this important point, we present additional examples
with a different initially failing node. All these examples start from the setup shown in Figure 1.
Their outcome should be compared to the respective examples discussed in Figures 2, 3, 4
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
0
0.7
A
0
0.7
B
0
0
C
0
0.3
D
0
0.5
E
0
0.55
F
0
0.55
G
0
0.55
H
0
0
I
inwards ↙ ↘ outwards
0
0.7
0
0.70
0
0
0.3
0.2
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0
0
0.7
0
0.70
0
0
0.3
1
0.5 0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0.55
0
0
↓
0
0.7
0
0.70
0
0.2
0.3
1
0.5 0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0
Figure 13: Constant damage. Example to be compare with Figure 2. Here, node I initially
failes.
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
0
0.7
A
0
0.7
B
0
0.3
C
0
0.3
D
0
0
E
0
0.55
F
0
0.55
G
0
0.55
H
0
0.55
I
inwards ↙ ↘ outwards
0
0.7
0
0.70
0.3
0.5
0.3
0
0 1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
↓
0
0.7
0
0.70.33
0.3
0.5
0.3
1
0 1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
↓
1
0.7
1
0.70.33
0.3
1
0.3
1
0 1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
↓
1
0.7
1
0.71
0.3
1
0.3
1
0 1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
1
0.55
0
0.7
0
0.70
0.3
0.2
0.3
0
0 0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
0.2
0.55
Figure 14: Constant damage. Example similar to the one in Figure 13 but with highest de-
gree node E failing initially. The example clearly shows a difference in the spreading properties
of hubs: in the ‘inwards variant’ the hub spreads failures to low-degree nodes; the opposite for
the ‘outwards variant’.
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
1
1.7
A
1
1.7
B
1
1.3
C
1
1
D
1
1.5
E
1
1.55
F
1
1.55
G
1
1.55
H
1
1.55
I
↓
1
1.7
1
1.71.5
1.3
0
1
1.5
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
links remain ↙ ↘ links fail
1.5
1.7
1.5
1.70
1.3
0
1
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.75
1.7
1.75
1.70
1.3
0
1
0
1.5 1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
↓
0
1.7
0
1.70
1.3
0
1
0
1.5 1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
1.38
1.55
Figure 15: Load redistribution. Compare with Fig. 3. Here, node D fails initially. w.r.t to
the previous case, this leads to a propagation of failures in the opposite direction, in the LLSC
variant (links fail), while nothing changes in the LLSS variant (links remain).
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φ
label
θ
non-failed node
failing node
failed node
-1 1
z
0
failing!
1
1.7
A
1
1.7
B
1
1.3
C
1
1.3
D
1
1.5
E
1
1.55
F
1
1.55
G
1
1.55
H
1
1
I
↓
1
1.7
1
1.71
1.3
1
1.3
2
1.5 1
1.55
1
1.55
1
1.55
0
1
↓
1
1.7
1
1.71
1.3
1.5
1.3
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
0
1
LLSC (links remain) ↙ ↘ LLSS (links fail)
(continued in next column)
(continuation)
↓
1
1.7
1
1.71.75
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.75
1.55
1.75
1.55
1.75
1.55
0
1
↓
4.5
1.7
4.5
1.70
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1
↓
0
1.7
0
1.70
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1.55
0
1
↓
1
1.7
1
1.72.5
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
0
1
↓
2.25
1.7
2.25
1.70
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
0
1
↓
0
1.7
0
1.70
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.5 1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
1.5
1.55
0
1
Figure 16: Load redistribution. Compare with Figure 3. Here, node I fails initially. This
leads to full breakdown in the LLSC variant (links remain), while some nodes do not fail in the
LLSS variant (links fail) because of a disconnection in the network.
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